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The programs providing income to the elderly in the Netherlands may be char- 
acterized according to a limited number of  salient features. First, there is a 
distinct cutoff at age sixty-five. Broadly speaking, all persons age sixty-five or 
over are entitled to the same general old age pension (AOW, we refer to this as 
social security). Most other benefits (e.g., disability, unemployment, welfare) 
expire when someone turns age sixty-five. Second, both over and under age 
sixty-five, next to the entitlement programs guaranteed by law, relatively many 
people who stop working are entitled to other benefits, for example, occupa- 
tional pensions supplementing social security for persons over age sixty-five 
and early retirement pensions for persons under age sixty-five. Strictly speak- 
ing, benefits of the latter type are not part of the social security system. How- 
ever, these benefits provide powerful incentives to retire next to the benefits 
provided by social security. 
Until recently, studies about the incentives provided by  social security to 
retire in the Netherlands were scarce (see sec. 7.2  below and app. B). In fact, 
most people no longer work when they reach age sixty-five. This may be as- 
cribed partly to pressure by  employers to take early retirement and partly to 
various other earnings replacement schemes for people under age sixty-five. 
Like most other developed countries, the Netherlands is faced with an in- 
creasing share of elderly persons in the total population. The share of the popu- 
lation over age sixty-five has grown from 8 percent in 1950 to 13 percent in 
1995 and is expected to rise to 21 percent by  the year 2050. If  nothing else 
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changes, this will cause a considerable increase in social security expenditures. 
However, the fact that occupational pensions for persons over age sixty-five 
are fully funded gives the Netherlands  a relative advantage over many other 
countries. A more immediate concern is the low participation rate for persons 
under age sixty-five and the costs of the programs providing income to these 
persons, both public programs, such as disability insurance, and occupational 
early retirement  schemes. In recent years, the government has considerably 
limited access to and the attractiveness of disability insurance in order to limit 
the costs of the program. Moreover, many firms have started to negotiate re- 
forms in early retirement programs because the financial burden of these pro- 
grams is threatening profits. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 7.1, we present statistics about 
the labor market behavior of  older people in the Netherlands, both cross sec- 
tionally and over time. In section 7.2, we describe the structure of the entitle- 
ment schemes for the elderly in the Netherlands and give a brief description of 
recent research in the Netherlands on the retirement incentives inherent in the 
system. Finally, in section 7.3, we present the results of simulating the retire- 
ment incentives inherent in the social security system, calculating the implicit 
tax on continued work for older people at different retirement ages. 
7.1  The Labor Market Behavior of Older Persons in the Netherlands 
The data used to obtain the figures presented in this section are drawn from 
a number of different sources. These are summarized in appendix A. 
7.1.1  Historical Trends 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 graph the labor force participation rates of older men and 
women in different age groups since 1960. For older men, there is a decline in 
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Fig. 7.2  Historical trends in the labor force participation of older women 
labor force participation in all age groups. The decline is particularly dramatic 
for sixty to sixty-four-year-olds. In  1960, about 80 percent of this age group 
was in the labor force, as opposed to only 20 percent in 1994. For men aged 
sixty-five or over, labor force participation declined from about 20 percent in 
1960  to about 3 percent in 1985. After that year, Statistics Netherlands stopped 
recording labor force participation for this age group. 
For women, there is a notable increase in labor force participation in the age 
group forty-five to fifty-four (from less than 20 percent in 1960 to more than 
40 percent in 1994). There is also a slight increase in the participation rate in 
the age group fifty-five to fifty-nine. The participation rates in the oldest age 
groups remained low. 
It is clear that the changes in the social security system in the period con- 
cerned are not the main factor explaining the declining labor force participa- 
tion rates since social security provides an income only to persons age sixty- 
five or older and the largest decline in labor force participation  took place 
among persons younger than age sixty-five. Yet  the proliferation  of occupa- 
tional  pensions  in addition to the basic pension  provided by  social security 
made it  less and less likely that  persons would  continue to work  after age 
sixty-five. 
In  the  younger  age  groups,  the  relatively  generous  disability  insurance 
scheme (introduced  in  1967) offered  an attractive way  to retire  before  age 
sixty-five. In particular, in the  1970s and 1980s, when the Netherlands faced 
periods of rapidly increasing unemployment, the disability route to retirement 
for older employees became a very popular alternative to general layoffs. In 
1968, 12 percent of the males between  fifty-five and sixty-four years of age 
received  a disability insurance  benefit. From  1975 to  1985, this percentage 
increased from 21 to 37 percent. In 1995, about one-third of the males between 
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In addition, in the face of continued pressure to decrease labor costs, many 
firms started to offer even more generous early retirement programs. In  1981, 
about 2 percent of the males between the ages of fifty-five and sixty-four re- 
ceived an early retirement (VUT) benefit; by  1987, this percentage had in- 
creased to about 10 percent and by  1995 to about 17 percent.’ 
7.1.2  Labor Market Behavior in 1994 
For a more detailed picture of  labor force participation in  recent years, 
we use the  199311994 Housing Needs Survey (Woningbehoeftenonderzoek, 
WBO). The WBO is a large, nationally representative survey (fifty-five thou- 
sand households) that, among other things, records  labor force attachment 
and income. 
The age pattern of labor force participation for men and women in 1994 is 
depicted in figure 7.3. At age forty-five, almost 95 percent of  men and about 
55 percent of women participate in the labor force; that is, either they classify 
their main activity as paid work, or they call themselves unemployed. Among 
men, participation drops gradually to about 85 percent for fifty-four-year-olds 
and then starts dropping sharply, to about 55 percent for fifty-nine-year-olds. 
Between the ages of fifty-nine and sixty, there is a drop of another 20 percent 
to a level of 35 percent, and, up to age sixty-two, participation drops further to 
about 20 percent. At age sixty-five, there is a further drop to about 10 percent, 
and, over age sixty-five, only about 5 percent of the male population is in the 
labor force. 
For women, participation gradually declines from 55 percent at age forty- 
five to about 22 percent at age fifty-nine. From age fifty-nine to age sixty, par- 
ticipation halves to about 11 percent. Above age sixty-five, hardly any woman 
considers herself to be part of the labor force. 
Figures 7.4 and 7.5 further subdivide males and females into socioeconomic 
groups. Figure 7.4 shows that up to age fifty-five the group nonworking males 
consists mainly of the disabled. After age fifty-five, the percentage of the dis- 
abled still rises to about 25 percent between the ages of  sixty and sixty-five,’ 
but the percentage of retirees rises from almost zero at age fifty-four to almost 
50 percent beyond age sixty. Beyond age sixty-five, a large majority of  men 
consider themselves to be retired. Figure 7.5 shows that most nonparticipating 
women  younger than  age sixty-five are classified as “other.” This pertains 
largely to housewives. The percentage of the disabled rises slightly from age 
forty-five to age sixty-four but remains clearly lower than the corresponding 
1. These figures include only early retirement (VUT) benefits and do not take account of persons 
who received a regular old age pension before age sixty-five. In a limited number of occupations, 
the official pension age is younger than sixty-five. Moreover, some pension funds used to offer 
retirement after forty years of work if this number was reached before age sixty-five. 
2. These numbers are lower than the numbers quoted above, where it is stated that about one- 
third of the males between the ages of  fifty-five and sixty-four receive disability benefits. The 
numbers given above stem from registers. Apparently, the WBO underrepresents disability insur- 
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Fig. 7.7  Percentage receiving private pension by age and sex 
percentage for men. The same holds for the percentage of  retirees up to age 
sixty-four. After age sixty-five, almost all women call themselves retired. 
Figures 7.6 and 7.7 examine the incidence of public assistance and private 
retirement income for older persons. Figure 6.6  graphs the percentage of men 
receiving social security, disability insurance, and any other kind of public as- 
sistance (excluding child benefits):  the most important kinds of  benefits  are 
disability benefits, unemployment benefits, social assistance (welfare benefits), 
and social security. In principle,  social security is paid  to persons over age 
sixty-five, the other benefits  mainly (in the case of  disability insurance and 
unemployment benefits exclusively) to younger persons. 
At age forty-five, about  12 percent of men receive  some form of benefit. 
This percentage rises gradually to about 23 percent at age fifty-four and then 
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Fig. 7.8  Distribution of family income by source 
fifty-five and  sixty-four, the percentage  of  men  receiving  public  assistance 
shows a small increase to about 40 percent, and then it explodes to about 95 
percent at age sixty-five and above. 
Figure 7.7 reports the percentages of men and women at each age who are 
receiving private pension  in~ome.~  For men, this percentage  increases from 
about 5 percent at age fifty-five to about 23 percent at age fifty-nine. Between 
the ages of fifty-nine and sixty, there is a fairly sharp increase of  almost 20 
percent to 42 percent. The percentage of  males receiving private pensions in- 
creases further to about 50 percent at age sixty-two. Between the ages of sixty- 
four and sixty-five, there is again a sharp increase to almost 75 percent. Over 
age sixty-five, between 75 and 80 percent of men report that they receive pri- 
vate pensions. 
For women, the percentages receiving private pensions  after age fifty-five 
are considerably lower than they are for men. The increase to about 30 percent 
at age seventy-four is fairly smooth. The increase of about 10 percent between 
the ages of seventy-four and seventy-five is remarkable. It should be noted that 
many private pension funds in the Netherlands have an arrangement for wid- 
ows’ pensions. Therefore, the pensions received by  women are not all due to 
their own labor market history. 
Figure 7.8 shows the distribution of family income by source for couples, 
plotted against the age of the family head. Four sources of income are consid- 
ered: earnings,  capital  income,  private  pensions,  and  public-sector  income 
(mainly social security for persons age sixty-five or over, disability insurance, 
and other public benefits  for younger persons).  Below age fifty-three,  more 
than 80 percent of income consists of earnings. Between the ages of fifty-eight 
and sixty-five, earnings decline from 60 to about 5 percent of income. Capital 
3. This includes early retirement benefits. 276  Arie Kapteyn and Klaas de Vos 
income is not a large component in any of the age groups. Private pensions 
(including early retirement) start to make up a significant portion of total in- 
come at about age fifty-six, a portion that rises to more than 50 percent at 
some ages between sixty and sixty-five, which illustrates the importance of 
this component in the decision to retire before age sixty-five. After age sixty- 
five, private pensions make up about 35-40  percent of total income. The share 
of public benefits increases from about 5 percent for the age groups under fifty 
to about 25 percent for the age groups between the ages of sixty and sixty-five. 
Over age sixty-five, public benefits consist mainly of social security and make 
up about 50 percent of total income on average. 
7.2  Key Features of the Social Security System 
7.2.1  A History of the Social Security System in the Netherlands 
The General Old Age Pension Law (Algemene Ouderdomswet, AOW, i.e., 
social security) was introduced in  1957. Its purpose was to guarantee a suffi- 
cient income to virtually all persons age sixty-five or over. The AOW was pre- 
ceded by several earlier schemes, such as the so-called Drees Emergency Law 
(Noodwet Drees, 1949):  which provided less broad coverage. Since 1980, the 
level of social security benefits has been linked to the statutory minimum wage. 
Couples with a head over age sixty-five were entitled to a social security benefit 
equal to the after-tax minimum wage, and single persons over age sixty-five 
were entitled to a social security benefit equal to 70 percent of the (after-tax) 
minimum wage. 
7.2.2  Current Features of the Social Security System 
In  1994, the system was changed in such a way  that each individual age 
sixty-five or over is now entitled to SO percent of the minimum wage, with a 
supplement of 20 percent for single persons, of 40 percent for single parents 
with a dependent child under age eighteen, and of up to 50 percent for persons 
with a partner under age sixty-five (the percentage depends on the income of 
the partner). 
Social security is financed purely on a pay-as-you-go basis by  a payroll tax 
on taxable income of persons under age sixty-five. The associated tax rate is 
currently (1996) 15.4 percent levied on taxable income up to a maximum (of 
f 45,325 per year). Social security basically provides equal coverage for all 
persons over age sixty-five. An exception is those persons who spent part of 
their working life (age fifteen to sixty-four) abroad. In that case, social security 
benefits are reduced by 2 percent for every year spent abroad. In 1994, social 
security benefits amounted to about f 32 billion, or 5 percent of  GDP. Cur- 
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rently, about one in every five households in the Netherlands receives social se- 
The entitlement to social security does not require retirement from the la- 
curity. 
bor force. 
7.2.3  Other Public Programs 
A number of arrangements exist that enable persons to stop working before 
turning age sixty-five. The main ones are disability insurance, unemployment 
benefits, and various early retirement  schemes. Together, these schemes in- 
duced the number of persons working in the age bracket sixty to sixty-five to 
drop dramatically over the last thirty-five years (cf. fig. 7.1 above). 
One important benefit program is the Disability Insurance Act (Wet op de 
Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering,  WAO) introduced in 1967. Disability in- 
surance covers all employees (except civil servants, who have their own, very 
similar, arrangements) against loss of earnings due to long-term sickness and 
disability. Until  1992, disability  insurance  guaranteed  employees  who lost 
more than 80 percent of  their earnings capacity a benefit of 70 percent (80 
percent before 1985) of their daily wage (up to a maximum) up to age sixty- 
five. Currently, disability benefits start at 70 percent of previous earnings (up 
to a maximum), but they fall to a lower level after a certain period (both the 
length of this period and the percentage depend on age). However, most em- 
ployees have taken out additional insurance to cover the risk of the disability 
insurance benefit falling below 70 percent of their previous  earning^.^ 
In the 1980s, disability insurance became a very popular arrangement, one 
that employers could use to get rid of elderly, less productive employees. Se- 
vere legal obstacles existed (and still exist) to laying off employees, and dis- 
ability benefits were more generous than unemployment benefits? As a result 
of  this, both employers and employees had a preference for the disability route 
to unemployment. The ensuing rise in the costs of disability insurance induced 
the government to limit eligibility for disability insurance by tightening entry 
conditions and reducing benefit levels. Moreover, persons receiving disability 
benefits are now subject to a more rigorous screening of their loss of earnings 
capacity. 
As mentioned above, unemployment benefits (Werkloosheidswet, WW) are 
less generous than disability benefits, mainly because they are paid for only a 
5. It should be noted that, for single earners who lost more than 80 percent of their earnings 
capacity, disability benefits are always at least as high as the relevant social assistance (welfare) 
level (ABWBWW), which, for a couple, is approximately equal to the after-tax minimum wage. 
In contrast to the entitlement to social assistance, household wealth is not taken into account. 
6.  Disability benefits continued until the individual receiving them reached age sixty-five. Un- 
employment benefits typically lasted for only two and a half years (but longer for older workers). 
Furthermore, while an individual was on disability, his pension rights often continued to accumu- 
late as if  he were still employed (the arrangements varied by pension fund), whereas the unem- 
ployed accumulated very few, if any, pension rights. 278  Arie Kapteyn and Klaas de Vos 
limited period (depending on the number of years worked before unemploy- 
ment). However, most people age sixty or over who become unemployed can 
expect to receive unemployment benefits equal to 70 percent of their previous 
earnings up to age ~ixty-five.~  Another relevant feature is that, over age 57.5, 
the unemployed no longer must register with an employment agency and thus 
de facto can retire from the labor market. 
Households with a head younger than age sixty-five without other sources 
of  income  (and  limited  household  wealth)  are entitled  to  social  assistance 
(ABW, or Algemene Bijstandswet [General Social Assistance Act], and RWW, 
or Rijksgroepsregeling  Werkloze  Werknemers  [State  Unemployment Act]). 
The level of the benefits is approximately equal to the level of social security 
for persons over age sixty-five. Since social security is linked to the minimum 
wage, this implies that, for employees earning low wages, the replacement rate 
is about  100 percent.  Hence, in particular for those with low wages who are 
over 57.5 years of age and hence have no obligation to look for a job in order 
to qualify for benefits, early retirement does not involve a loss of income. 
All public benefits for persons younger than age sixty-five are paid only to 
the extent that a person is not employed.x 
7.2.4  Private Transfers 
Next to social security, a majority of the population  over age sixty-five is 
entitled to a supplementary occupational pension. Meuwissen (1993) estimates 
that about 80 percent of households with a head aged sixty-five or  over re- 
ceived some form of additional pension in 1989. It can safely be assumed that 
this percentage has only increased since then. Of those households not receiv- 
ing a pension, more than half draw additional income from other sources, for 
example, capital income. Typically, occupational pensions supplement social 
security to 70 percent of final pay for persons who have worked for forty years. 
After tax, the replacement rate is usually substantially higher. 
In general, if  an employer offers a pension  scheme, then  participation in 
such a scheme is compulsory. More than 99 percent of the pension schemes 
are of the defined-benefit type,9 whereas the remainder (0.6 percent) are of the 
defined-contribution type. More than 72 percent of  the pension benefits are 
defined on the basis of final pay, the remainder being a mixed bag of various 
combinations of final pay, fixed amounts, and average pay. Combining the ef- 
fects of  social security and private  pension  schemes leads to the following 
before-tax replacement rates for those individuals who have contributed for a 
sufficient number of years: 34 percent receive less than 60 percent, 27 percent 
between  60 and 69 percent, 20 percent between 70 and 79 percent, and  19 
7. As with disability benefits, if necessary, the unemployment benefit is supplemented by  wel- 
fare benefits to reach the social assistance level; household wealth is not taken into account. Hence, 
for single earners with low wages, the replacement rate can be almost  I00  percent. 
8. For those employed part-time, benefits may supplement their earnings. 
9. The information in this paragraph stems from PN (1987). 279  Social Security and Retirement in the Netherlands 
percent at least 80 percent of final pay. One should keep in mind that after-tax 
replacement rates may be substantially higher. 
Most large firms have their own pension fund; smaller firms usually partici- 
pate in sectorwide pension funds. In the latter case, the contribution rates do 
not differ between firms, depending on the composition of the labor force. 
Private pension  arrangements usually require that people leave the job in 
which they accumulate pension rights at age sixty-five at the latest. There is 
no earnings test, however, and people may consider looking for secondary jobs 
once they retire. 
Early retirement became increasingly common  during the  1980s and was 
viewed as a means of  reducing unemployment. In recent years, the costs of 
early retirement have increased considerably, and many firms are currently try- 
ing to reduce these costs by reducing entitlements or increasing the minimum 
age at which employees are eligible for early retirement. Typically, early re- 
tirement schemes guarantee an employee a benefit equal to 70 or 80 percent 
of previous earnings up to age sixty-five. In after-tax terms, replacement rates 
are even higher. Furthermore, while in early retirement, one often continues 
to accumulate pension  rights,  although possibly  at a lower  rate than  when 
working. 
Early retirement may be organized via the pension funds, which also provide 
the occupational pensions, or via the employer itself. Moreover, in contrast to 
these pensions, early retirement is usually financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
Early retirement usually requires ten years of employment with the same em- 
ployer before the early retirement date, whereas old age pension rights remain 
valid if the worker changes jobs. The payment of an early retirement pension 
usually requires complete withdrawal from the labor market. 
Figures 7.9 and 7.10 give the hazard rates of labor force exit for men and 
women, defined as the number of  persons who leave the labor force at the 
specified age, relative to the size of the labor force a year earlier. These figures 
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are based on 1992-93  Socio-Economic Panel data. Because of the size of the 
panel and the low participation rates over age sixty or so, the figures should be 
considered only illustrative. Nevertheless, for men, the figures suggest that the 
hazard rates of leaving the labor force surpass 20 percent around age fifty- 
seven and peak at age sixty, which is consistent with the proliferation of early 
retirement programs. For women, the figures are based on even smaller num- 
bers of observations. Here, we find that leaving the labor force occurs more 
frequently at earlier ages but also peaks around age sixty. 
It can be concluded that, in the Netherlands, there exists an elaborate system 
of  income replacing transfers that can be expected to act as an incentive to 
leave the labor force on one's sixty-fifth birthday at the latest. Moreover, it 
should be noted that, whereas rather strict laws are in force that prevent em- 
ployers laying off younger employees, reaching the age of sixty-five is a legal 
reason for discharge, and social insurance protecting against loss of earnings 
as a result of  sickness, disability, or unemployment covers only employees 
younger than age sixty-five. 
7.2.5  The Retirement Effects of  Social Security-Empirical  Evidence 
Until recently, the literature on the retirement effects of social security, dis- 
ability, or unemployment programs in the Netherlands was quite thin. Papers 
on this issue were usually descriptive and qualitative in nature. This situation 
has changed in the 1990s owing to an initiative of the so-called NESTOR pro- 
gram.1° Under this program, a substantial grant was given to a group of re- 
searchers at the University of  Leiden  (who subsequently called themselves 
CERRA, the Centre for Economic Research on Retirement and Aging) to set 
10. NESTOR is an acronym (in Dutch) for the Netherlands Program for Research on Aging. It 
is probably best compared with the National Institute of Aging in the United States, keeping in 
mind that NESTOR was only a temporary program. 281  Social Security and Retirement in the Netherlands 
up a panel of elderly households (at the time of the first wave, 1993, the head 
of the household had to be between forty-three and sixty-three years of age) as 
well as a research program using these data. A fair amount of the research 
produced by CERRA has been on retirement.'l 
An overview of the empirical literature on retirement in the Netherlands is 
given in appendix B. The literature brings out a number of salient, although 
perhaps not surprising, facts: There exist powerful incentives to retire early, 
and people usually retire as soon as they are eligible. Both unemployment and 
disability act as alternatives for early retirement. The choice between the three 
exit routes (unemployment, disability, and early retirement)  is partly driven 
by the financial attractiveness of  the routes. The dramatic fall in labor force 
participation among the elderly in the Netherlands can probably be explained 
largely by the introduction of additional incentives to retire over the last three 
decades. 
7.3  Retirement Incentives 
In this section, we estimate social security wealth and pension wealth for a 
number of stylized cases to assess the incentives of social security and private 
pensions through accrual rate effects. For simplicity of terminology, the term 
social security wealth will include pension wealth, unless explicitly stated oth- 
erwise. 
7.3.1  Simulation 
In the Netherlands, roughly after age sixty, the levels of unemployment and 
disability benefits (both until age sixty-five) and social security (after age sixty- 
five) do not depend on the age of retirement. After becoming unemployed or 
disabled, the worker can expect to keep the same level of benefits up to age 
sixty-five. After age sixty-five, social security is independent of work history. 
Hence, if we limit ourselves to these three benefit types, the implicit subsidy 
on retiring (the change in the worker's future benefits, relative to what he would 
earn in the coming year) will be equal to the replacement rate (the level of 
benefits in the coming year relative to his earnings in the coming year) plus the 
rates of  contribution to the programs. The only way  in which an employee's 
future income (after the coming year) may be affected by  retiring one year 
earlier is via his or her private pension. Retiring before  age sixty-five may 
affect the level of private pension to be received after age sixty-five by reducing 
the number of years counting toward pension benefits. 
In this section, we compute social security and pension wealth, accrual rates, 
and implicit tdsubsidy rates for persons aged fifty-five in January 1985, de- 
pending on when they stop working (between  1985 and 2000, i.e., between 
their fifty-fifth and seventieth birthdays). As in Diamond and Gruber (chap. 11 
11. A description of  the research program can be found in CERRA (1996). 282  Arie Kapteyn and Klaas de Vos 
in this volume), accrual rates are defined as the change in the worker's social 
security and pension wealth relative to the social security and pension wealth 
obtaining if he retires one year earlier, and taxhbsidy  rates are defined as the 
change in the social security and pension wealth relative to what he would earn 
over the coming year. Social security and pension wealth (the sum of which 
will be denoted by  SSW) is calculated as the actuarially discounted  sum of 
future benefits  minus the discounted  sum of future contributions to the pro- 
grams involved when still at work. In our computations,  we distinguish four 
baseline cases: (a)  persons who receive an early retirement pension when they 
stop working at age sixty'* or later and who will receive a private pension in 
addition to social security once they turn age sixty-five; (b)  persons who re- 
ceive a disability benefit when they stop working before age sixty-five and who 
will receive a private pension in addition to social security once they turn age 
sixty-five;  (c)  persons who will  receive only social security when they  turn 
age sixty-five; and (d)  persons who receive a disability benefit when they stop 
working before age sixty-five and who will receive only social security when 
they turn age sixty-five. 
As can be inferred from the data given in section 7.1 above, cases a and b 
are the most common ones. A large majority of employees are entitled to pri- 
vate  pensions  in  addition  to social  security  when they  turn  age  sixty-five. 
Moreover, most firms have early retirement programs, and all employees have 
disability insurance. Early retirement usually requires ten years of continuous 
service with the same employer, which would mean that most elderly employ- 
ees qualify. Access to the disability route is supposed to be limited to persons 
unable to work, which has been relatively easy to prove until fairly recently. 
Cases c and d are valid only for the (very small) groups of employees who, on 
retirement, are entitled to public benefits only. 
For all entitlements, we assume zero growth in real terms after 1995.13  For 
survival probabilities, we use the sex/age-specific survival tables of Statistics 
Netherlands (1992). We assume independence between the mortality rates of 
the worker and his spouse. We use a real discount rate of 3 percent. To compute 
net benefit and pension levels, we subtract payroll and income taxes. For the 
years after 1995, we use the tax schedule for 1995, keeping tax rates and brack- 
ets fixed in real terms. 
To produce our baseline numbers, we consider a typical male who was born 
in January 1930 and thus turned age fifty-five in January 1985. We assume that 
his annual before-tax earnings in  1985 equal f 48,152, which is equal to the 
median earnings for males working more than thirty-two hours per week in the 
age group fifty to fifty-nine, as based on the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) of 
12. It should be noted that the early retirement age varies by employer or sector. In the calcula- 
tions, we assume that early retirement is possible as of age sixty. 
13. For disability, social security, and unemployment benefits, this is more or less in line with 
current government policy. Some private pension funds guarantee that pensions will grow with the 
increase in real wages, however. 283  Social Security and Retirement in the Netherlands 
1985. We assume that the worker’s wife is three years younger than he is and 
that she has no earnings herself. 
We assume that, between 1985 and 1995, the wage has moved with the index 
for the statutory minimum wage. 
7.3.2  Base-Case Results 
We consider a worker who may or may not be working another year between 
his fifty-fifth and seventieth birthdays. The results are shown in table 7.1, and 
the resulting taxkubsidy rates are graphed in figure 7.11. In general, working 
another year can affect social security wealth in different ways: 
1. The worker younger than  age sixty-five who chooses to work  another 
year must pay payroll taxes toward social security, unemployment insurance, 
disability insurance, and, possibly, private pensions. This lowers net social se- 
curity wealth. 
2. The worker younger than agp, sixty-five may forgo a year of benefits (dis- 
ability insurance, early retirement if over age sixty), which lowers net social 
security wealth. 
3. At age fifty-nine, the worker would be entitled to early retirement only if 
he worked another year. This would considerably increase net social security 
wealth. 
4. Working another year (up to age sixty-five) would imply accumulating 
another year of occupational pension rights, which increases net social secu- 
rity wealth. 
5. Working another year after age sixty-five could imply forgoing a year of 
occupational pensions and receiving a lower amount of net social security ben- 
efits than without earnings. This would decrease net social security wealth. 
The four baseline cases can be summarized as follows: 
a)  Persons who are entitled to an early retirement pension at age sixty would 
typically lose the right to an early retirement pension and stop accumulating 
pension rights when they stop working before that age. In the calculations, we 
assume that they go on accumulating pension rights until their sixty-fifth birth- 
day if they take early retirement. Because, typically, entry in an occupational 
pension scheme is impossible before age twenty-five, we assume that individu- 
als have started accumulating pension rights at age twenty-five. 
As early retirement is assumed to be possible only as of age sixty, no re- 
placement rate is reported in the table until the age at the last year of work 
is fifty-nine. Typically, early retirement pensions pay 80 percent of previous 
earnings; the after-tax replacement rate is about 90 percent. After age sixty- 
five, the occupational  pensions  supplement  social security  to  70 percent  of 
final pay, which likewise results in an after-tax replacement rate of about 90 
percent as a result of the fact that persons aged sixty-five or over no longer pay 
contributions to social security or other payroll taxes. 
From age fifty-five to age fifty-eight, every additional year of work results 
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Table 7.1  (continued) 
Age at 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
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Note: SS = social security; ER = early retirement; PP = private pension; SSW = social security 
wealth; DI = disability insurance. 
additional year, an individual accumulates an additional year of pension rights, 
which increases the pension to be received after age sixty-five. However, the 
net present value of this is much lower than the contributions paid by the indi- 
vidual and his employer for social security, pensions, disability insurance, and 
unemployment insurance. In fact, there is an implicit tax of around 60 percent 
of net earnings on working an additional year.14 
When an individual works until his sixtieth birthday, he is assumed to be 
entitled to early retirement. As a result of this, his social security wealth in- 
creases by more than 50 percent, and there is an implicit subsidy on his net 
earnings of more than 375 percent if on his fifty-ninth birthday he decides to 
work another year. 
From age sixty on, by working another year, workers not only pay another 
year of contributions toward social security, pensions, etc. but also forgo a year 
of early retirement benefits. Their pension rights (as of age sixty-five) are not 
affected. As a result, working another year is implicitly taxed at a rate of around 
130 percent of net earnings. 
The calculations for the cases in which the persons retire on their sixty-sixth 
14. It should be noted that one of the factors determining the accrual rates and the implicit tax 
rates is the contribution to be made to the occupational pension fund. These contributions vary 
considerably across pension funds. In the calculations, we have used the contributions valid for 
one of  the largest private pension  funds in  the Netherlands  (PGGM), operating  mainly in the 
health sector. 286  Arie Kapteyn and Klaas de Vos 
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Fig. 7.11  Taxhbsidy rates-base  cases 
Note: SS = social security:  ER = early retirement: PP = private pension; DI = disability in- 
surance. 
birthday  or later are tentative, at best, because retirement at age sixty-five is 
virtually automatic if those involved have not retired earlier. In the calculations, 
we assume that an individual who works after age sixty-five is paid the same 
net earnings as before his sixty-fifth birthday and, in addition, receives social 
security. Moreover, it is assumed that he stops accumulating pension rights and 
is not entitled to (occupational) pensions as long as he keeps working. 
Forgoing the occupational pension for a year results in a decrease of social 
security wealth by about 6.5 percent per year. This amounts to an implicit tax 
rate of about 33 percent on net earnings. 
All in all, the figures suggest that there is a huge incentive to stop working 
at the early retirement age, especially if one looks at social security and pen- 
sion wealth, the accrual rate, and the implicit tax rate. For most couples in the 
Netherlands, the replacement rate would be the most obvious decisive factor. 
Replacement rates of more than 90 percent make it likely that only very few 
persons would decide to work an extra year, for instance, if  they derive high 
nonmonetary rewards from work.'5 
b)  We  assume that  those who receive  a disability benefit  when  they  stop 
working before age sixty-five and an occupational pension in addition to social 
security after age sixty-five would stop accumulating pension rights once they 
receive disability benefits. 
If these persons would receive disability benefits, they receive 70 percent of 
their previous earnings, or almost 80 percent  after tax. By working an addi- 
tional year, the worker would forgo a year of disability insurance benefits and 
pay an additional year of contributions. On the plus side, he would accumulate 
15. It should also be noted that the loss of fringe benefits such as a company car might be taken 
into account in the decision whether to retire early. 287  Social Security and Retirement in the Netherlands 
additional pension rights. The net result is a decrease in social security wealth. 
This decrease in social security wealth drops from about f 42,000 in 1986 to 
f 24,000 in 1994, which amounts to an accrual rate increasing from -9  to -  16 
percent  or an implicit  tax rate on net earnings decreasing from almost  150 
percent in 1985 to 101 percent in 1994. 
The results for retiring  between  one’s sixty-sixth and seventieth birthdays 
are equal to the results of base case a. 
In this case, the figures suggest an incentive to retire into disability as soon 
as possible. The accrual rates and tax rates could be even higher if one keeps 
accumulating pension rights during disability (free of charge), as is the case in 
some pension schemes. 
Again it should be mentioned that probably the most important incentive to 
retire is the replacement rate. Although the replacement rate in terms of gross 
earnings was reduced  from 80 to 70 percent  in January  1985, this does not 
appear to have affected the attractiveness of the scheme very much. The intro- 
duction of sharper criteria for disability in recent years appears to have been 
somewhat more successful in reducing the inflow. 
c) We assume that those who receive only social security after age sixty- 
five would not receive any benefit until reaching age sixty-five if they retire 
voluntarily before that age. 
Because they would not receive any benefit, the replacement rate is, in fact, 
zero. If they continue working, the payment of contributions for social security, 
disability  insurance,  and  unemployment  insurance  causes  social  security 
wealth to decrease by 7-10  percent per year from 1985 to 1994, which implies 
an implicit tax rate of more than 47 percent  of  net earnings in  1985, which 
gradually decreases to 38 percent in  1994. In view of the replacement rate in 
this case, these numbers are probably not very relevant in practice. 
If  these individuals  retire after age sixty-five, we assume that they  would 
receive the same net earnings as before age sixty-six and, in addition, social 
security. The replacement rate of social security alone is about 61 percent. In 
this case, if they continue to work, they pay a higher income tax rate on their 
social security  benefit  than without earnings, which reduces social security 
wealth by  about 3 percent  per year (an implicit tax on earnings of  about  11 
percent). 
Again, looking at social security wealth only, the incentive would seem to 
be to retire as soon as possible. However, without any earnings replacing bene- 
fits, the option of retiring would not be feasible for most persons. 
d)  For those who receive a disability benefit when they stop working before 
age sixty-five and receive social security after age sixty-five, there are two main 
differences from case b above. First, when working, they would not pay pen- 
sion  contributions  toward  the  occupational  pension  scheme.  Second,  they 
would not receive an occupational pension after age sixty-five. 
If these persons were to retire between their sixty-sixth and seventieth birth- 
days, the results would be equal to base case c. Table 7.2 
Age at 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Taxi 
of Work  Rate  ssw  Accrual  Rate  Subsidy 
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Table 7.2  (continued) 
Age at 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 




.462  -  35,143  -3,075  ...  ,149 
,462  -38,033  -2,890  ...  .I44 
,462  -40,740  -2,707  ...  ,139 







































-  30,086 
-30,394 
-  28,765 
-28,309 







-  .270 
-  ,350 
-.530 













Note: SS = social security; ER = early retirement;  PP = private pension; SSW = social security 
wealth; DI = disability insurance. 
Because these persons do not pay pension contributions, both the replace- 
ment rates and the implicit tax rates are slightly lower than in case b above. 
However, solely from the viewpoint of  accrual rates and implicit tax rates, 
there is still a distinct incentive to retire as soon as possible. 
7.3.3  Other Cases 
Table 7.2 gives the analogous results for a single worker. The main differ- 
ences between  table  7.2  and  table  7.1  above  are  the  considerably lower 
amounts of  social security wealth accumulated by  a single worker. In most 
cases, the implicit tax rates are much the same as for a couple, while the ac- 
crual rates  are higher because the  denominator (social security wealth) is 
lower. 
Similar to the case for couples, the single worker who could take early retire- 
ment would find it attractive to take it at the earliest possible age if he could 
afford an income loss of  about 10 percent. The disability benefit option also 
appears to be very attractive. 
The next two tables, tables 7.3 and 7.4, concern workers who are at the 
ninetieth and tenth percentiles of  the earnings distribution, respectively (see 
also fig. 7.12). As is the case for the median, we take the ninetieth and tenth 
percentiles of the 1985 income distribution of full-time male workers between 
the ages of fifty and fifty-nine and assume that the time pattern of wages fol- 
lows that of the statutory minimum wage. Table 7.3 
Age at 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
of  Work  Rate  ssw  Accrual  Rate  Subsidy 
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Table 7.3  (continued) 
Age at 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Taxi 
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Note: SS = Social Security: ER = early retirement: PP = private pension: SSW = social security 
\health: DI = disability insurance. 
The replacement rates, accrual rates, and taxhbsidy rates for workers at the 
ninetieth percentile (table 7.3) who are entitled to early retirement are much 
the same as those for workers with a median wage. The main difference con- 
cerns the unlikely case of retiring after age sixty-five. Since, for high-income 
workers, occupational pensions  make up a larger share of  total income after 
age sixty-five, these workers would  forgo a larger amount by  continuing  to 
work after age sixty-five. It should be remembered that the basic social security 
benefit is paid regardless of whether the worker has retired  and that occupa- 
tional pensions are paid only if the worker has left his job. 
When  ninetieth  percentile  workers  receive  disability  insurance  benefits, 
their replacement rate is considerably lower than that for the median worker 
as a result of the ceiling in the public disability insurance system. The rates of 
accrual and the  implicit tax  rates  are also lower than  those for the  median 
worker.  However,  only  the  lower replacement  rate  suggests  that,  for these 
workers, retiring via the disability route is less attractive than for workers with 
lower wages.I6 
Ninetieth percentile workers who are not entitled to occupational pensions 
16. It  should be noted that.  in a number of  pension  arrangements.  the disability benefit for 
workers with wages above the public insurance ceiling is supplemented to 70 percent of previous 
earnings by the pension fund. For these workers. the replacement rate would be fairly close to that 
of  the median worker. Table 7.4 
Age at 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
of Work  Rate  ssw  Accrual  Rate  Subsidy 
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Table 7.4  (continued) 
Age at 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax / 
of Work  Rate  ssw  Accrual  Rate  Subsidy 
67  ,851  129,373  -  594  -  .005  .037 
68  .85 I  128,817  -556  -  ,004  .036 
69  .85 1  128,298  -519  -  ,004  ,035 
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Note: SS = social security; ER = early retirement; PP = private pension; SSW = social security 
wealth; DI = disability insurance. 
after their sixty-fifth birthday or to any benefit before age sixty-five have lower 
social security wealth than median workers if they retire after age fifty-five as 
a result of the higher contributions to social security, disability insurance, and 
unemployment insurance made during the years they  are still working. The 
accrual rates-the  decrease in social security wealth as a result of working an 
additional year-are  also higher than for median workers, in particular when 
they choose to continue working beyond age sixty. In that case, the amounts of 
payroll taxes paid toward social security, unemployment insurance, and dis- 
ability insurance reduce  social security wealth-the  denominator in the ac- 
crual rate calculations-to  such an extent that the accrual rates increase con- 
siderably, although the absolute amounts of the decrease remain limited. On 
the other hand, the implicit tax rates on net earnings are somewhat lower than 
for median workers because the contributions to social security, disability in- 
surance, and unemployment insurance are subject to a ceiling. After age sixty- 
five, the replacement rate of social security only is about 36.5 percent for work- 
ers at the ninetieth percentile. 
Ninetieth percentile workers who are entitled to disability insurance before 
age sixty-five and to social security only after age sixty-five also face lower 
replacement rates than median workers. Similar to the previous case, their ac- 
crual rates increase considerably when they continue to work, while the tax 
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Workers  who are at the tenth percentile  of  the earnings  distribution  face 
slightly  lower replacement rates than median workers if they  are entitled to 
early retirement. This is because the increase in net income as a result of the 
fact that pension contributions and payroll taxes no longer have to be paid is 
lower at this level of income. The rates of accrual and the implicit tax rates are 
slightly lower than at the median. 
In the case where these workers with low wages would  receive disability 
insurance, their benefits would be equal to the social minimum. As a result of 
this, the replacement rates for persons retiring before age sixty-five are higher 
than those for the median worker. The accrual rates and the implicit tax rates 
are much the same as those for median workers. 
For low-wage workers who, on reaching age sixty-five, are entitled only to 
social security, social security wealth is higher than for workers at the median. 
This is a result of the lower contributions to social security (and disability and 
unemployment  insurance)  made before  retiring,  which  are not  followed by 
lower benefits after age sixty-five. 
The replacement rate for the worker entitled to social security only is only 
marginally lower than that for the worker who is also entitled to private pen- 
sions after age sixty-five (351  as compared to .871), which shows that private 
pensions make up only a very small part of total income after retirement for 
low-wage workers. 
Table 7.5 presents the results for persons with an incomplete earnings his- 
tory. Social security benefits and disability benefits are not affected by the earn- 
ings history. With respect to occupational pensions, we assume that the persons 
have accumulated only thirty years of pension rights when working until age 
sixty-five instead of the maximum  of forty. Apart from a reduction in social 
security wealth, this hardly appears to affect the results. In fact, in monetary 
terms, the accruals are exactly the same in most cases because the amounts 
paid for contributions are the same and the amounts forgone in pension  re- 
ceipts are also the same, the increase in before-tax pensions as a result of accu- 
mulating one more pension year leading to a constant increase in net pensions 
at the relevant range of pensions. The amounts of accrual differ only if the 
threshold for the statutory health insurance for the elderly is crossed. 
As a result of having accumulated pension rights over thirty instead of forty 
years, the replacement rate of the pensions received after age sixty-five is re- 
duced by about 7 percent, from .91 to 34.  It should be noted that, in this case, 
the decrease for single workers would be higher (from .92 to .79), mainly be- 
cause the occupational pension makes up a larger share of the income for a 
single retiree than for a couple. 
Since, by working after age sixty-five, individuals forgo a lower amount of 
occupational pension, the amounts of accrual after age sixty-five are lower than 
those shown in table 7.1 above, as are the implicit tax rates. 
Summarizing the results of these calculations, it can be seen that the Dutch 
system of  social security, disability insurance, early retirement, and occupa- Table 7.5  Incentive Calculations for an Incomplete Earnings History 
Age at 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
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Table 7.5  (continued) 
Age at 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
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Nore: SS = social security; ER = early retirement; PP = private pension; SSW = social security 
wealth; DI = disability insurance. 
tional pensions results in great incentives to retire as early as possible, except 
in the case where the worker would be entitled to early retirement, in which 
case it would be attractive to wait until the early retirement age. These findings 
are fairly robust to changes in assumptions about earnings. Further calculations 
show that the results are also unaffected by changes in assumptions about dis- 
count rates, mortality, and wife’s age. The fact that very few persons in the 
Netherlands work until their sixty-fifth birthday can be seen to be entirely con- 
sistent with these findings. 
Nevertheless, some remarks are in order. First, it should be mentioned that 
the implicit tax rates take into account contributions to social security, disabil- 
ity insurance, unemployment insurance, and occupational pensions, which a 
worker in the Netherlands would hardly be able to estimate. In particular, pen- 
sion and social insurance contributions  made by the employer are often not 
mentioned on wage slips. Furthermore, payroll taxes are collected jointly with 
income taxes, and only a very well-informed worker would be able to identify 
them separately. In the end, what really seems to matter for the individual con- 
sidering retirement is the replacement rate. 
Second, the options open to workers depend on individual circumstances. 
Early retirement is currently a fairly general provision in most firms, but retire- 
ment via the disability route has been made more difficult in recent years. 298  Arie Kapteyn and Klaas de Vos 
7.4  Concluding remarks 
In the Netherlands, the system of provisions for elderly people who (have 
to) stop working can be characterized by two main dimensions. First, there is 
a division by age, between people age sixty-five and older and those under age 
sixty-five. Second, both public and private schemes are important. For people 
under age sixty-five, publicly provided disability and unemployment benefits 
exist next  to early retirement  schemes provided by  the employer. For most 
people over age sixty-five, private pensions supplement social security. 
The labor force participation of the elderly, especially of males, has dropped 
considerably over the last thirty-five years. Between the ages of sixty and sixty- 
five, only about 20 percent of males are in the labor force; over age sixty-five, 
participation is considered to be too low to be of interest. 
Combining public and private schemes, employees who stop working can 
mostly expect high replacement rates. The effect on future benefits of retiring 
now instead of working one more year is rather low. The resulting implicit tax 
rates of  working one more year are very high. This in itself  may provide a 
strong incentive to retire early. Yet, without further research, it would be hard 
to say which part of the drop in participation among older workers is due to 
those incentives and which part is involuntary, that is, due to real disability and 
involuntary  unemployment.  Empirical  research  available today  suggests that 
the incentives described here provide the main explanation for the sharp drop 
in labor force participation among the elderly part of the labor force. 
Appendix A 
Data Sources 
All data used come from Statistics Netherlands. 
Historical Data 
Data  are from the census (1960, 1971) and Labor Force Surveys (1975, 
1979, 1985, 1990, 1994). Figures are not adjusted for changes in definitions. 
Figures for labor force participation of persons aged sixty-five or over are not 
available after 1985. 
Contemporaneous Data 
For the detailed figures on labor force participation, we use the  1993/1994 
Housing Needs Survey (Woningbehoeftenonderzoek, WBO). The WBO is a 
large, nationally representative survey (fifty-five thousand households) that re- 
cords, among other things, labor force attachment and income. 
The figures on hazard rates (fig. 7.9 and 7.10 above) are based on the 1992 299  Social Security and Retirement in the Netherlands 
and 1993 waves of the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP). The income composition 
figures  (fig.  7.8 above)  are based  on the  latest Socio-Economic Panel data 
(1993) and pertain to the year  1992. The SEP is a nationally representative 
household panel consisting of about five thousand households. The figures per- 
tain to before-tax  incomes. It should be noted  that  the subdivision into age 
groups causes the numbers of observations on which the figures are based to 
be rather small. 
Appendix B 
The EfSect of Social Security on Retirement- 
Recent Evidence 
As noted by Woittiez, Lindeboom, and Theeuwes (1994,5), until recently there 
was “a paucity of empirical research” in the Netherlands on factors determin- 
ing retirement. Contributions that they mention are Delsen (1  989), who gives 
an  overview  of  early  retirement  schemes in  Europe; Bolhuis,  Ottens, and 
Steenbeek-Vervoort (1987), who discuss the problem of the financial sustain- 
ability of early retirement schemes introduced in the early 1980s; and Henkens 
and Siegers (1990), who provide one of the first quantitative analyses of retire- 
ment decisions of males in the Netherlands. The most prominent study in this 
“earlier literature” is undoubtedly Aarts and de Jong (1992). Their monograph 
reports on a project covering more than a decade of research into the determi- 
nants of disability. Next to obvious health factors, financial considerations are 
found to play an important role. Indeed, this study was the first to document 
by means of quantitative analysis the fact that the disability scheme was both 
a financially attractive route into early retirement for the employee and a con- 
venient way to lay off elderly employees. 
In view of the tightening of the eligibility rules for disability, the reduction 
of disability benefit levels, and the simultaneous introduction of various gener- 
ous early retirement schemes, one would expect a substitution of channels into 
retirement as a result of this. Woittiez, Lindeboom, and Theeuwes (1994) study 
precisely this point. By means of both multinomial logit and conditional logit 
models, they model the probability of finding elderly individuals (defined as 
being between forty-eight  and sixty-two years of  age) in one of four states: 
working, disabled, unemployed, or early retired. They find a significant role 
for financial incentives; that is, a state becomes more likely if  the associated 
income level is higher. Simulations with their models show, for instance, that 
a 10 percent reduction of  benefits in the nonworking states raises the percent- 
age of individuals found working by a few percentage points. The authors also 
find evidence  for stigma effects  (cf. Moffit  1983) in their  conditional  logit 
model, indicating that the state of unemployment is valued below the state of 300  Arie Kapteyn and Klaas de Vos 
disability and that both are valued below early retirement. This finding is partly 
supported by Woittiez and Theeuwes (1998), who use self-reported measures 
of life satisfaction as well as several measures of mental and physical health to 
find that, other things being equal, people who work are generally better off 
than those who do not, with early retirees running a close second. The disabled 
are the least satisfied with  their life, whereas the unemployed  are above the 
disabled and below the early retired. The key difference between  the unem- 
ployed and the early retired lies in the involuntary nature of the former state. 
Indeed, the authors find that it is precisely this involuntary nature that explains 
most of the dissatisfaction of  the unemployed. 
In principle, early retirement can also have a involuntary nature as an em- 
ployer may pressure an employee who is eligible for early retirement to leave 
the firm. Thio (1995) lumps together all exit routes considered so far (disabil- 
ity, early retirement,  and unemployment)  for a  sample of  household  heads 
between  the ages of fifty-three and sixty-three. Everyone not working in his 
sample has indicated whether the separation from the last job was involuntary 
(dismissal, forced by  the  firm,  afraid  of  being  laid  off) or voluntary  (had 
“worked long enough,” etc.). He then uses a competing risks model to explain 
these different routes into retirement. He does find some evidence for involun- 
tary early retirement, although this is not significant. Nevertheless, early retire- 
ment  remains  the  favorite  exit  route  out  of  employment.  In  Kerkhofs, 
Theeuwes, and Woittiez (1996), transitions out of a job are analyzed by means 
of a duration model. They also establish a substitution pattern in the choice of 
exit routes. When the early retirement route is available, it dominates the other 
exit routes. 
As both  eligibility rules and replacement rates for early retirement differ 
across firms (or sectors), one may suspect that employees and employers match 
to their mutual benefit. Workers with a preference for early retirement may 
match with firms that offer relatively low wages and the possibility of retiring 
early. Firms (or sectors) that need healthy young workers may decide to offer 
generous early retirement schemes. Thio and Woittiez (1996) investigate this 
issue by estimating a hedonic price relation in which the wage offered to an 
individual employee is related to characteristics determining worker productiv- 
ity and early retirement benefits. The early retirement benefits are constructed 
on the basis of a wage-growth equation and specific information on the early 
retirement rules for the firm. These are converted into a ratio of the expected 
present value of early retirement to the expected present value of wages. It is 
found that there is a trade-off between wages and early retirement benefits, but 
not one for one; that is, the better early retirement benefits are not fully re- 
flected in lower wages. This finding seems to be consistent with the behavior 
of employers in the Netherlands, who are increasingly anxious to change the 
early retirement rules as these turn out to be much more expensive than origi- 
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Clearly, for this type of study, the availability of data for both employees and 
employers is essential. Another study taking advantage of this is Theeuwes and 
Lindeboom  (1995). These authors match firm and employee data to analyze 
the effect of exit routes on the number of elderly employees leaving the firm. 
They provide evidence that there is some, but not full, substitution between 
channels into retirement. This gives room for policy measures to reduce retire- 
ment. On the basis of employee data only, they find that eligibility require- 
ments, rather than benefit levels, determine the moment of retirement. Heyma 
and Thio (1  994) take up the issue of explaining differences in labor force par- 
ticipation among elderly workers between the United States and the Nether- 
lands, exploiting the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) and the CERRA 
samples. They first estimate standard probit participation equations as well as 
nonparametric variants. Next, they consider simple transition models. Qualita- 
tively, the models are not very different across the two countries; parameter 
estimates generally have the same sign, with one major exception: (imputed) 
log wage has a positive effect on the probability of participation in the Nether- 
lands and a negative effect in the United States. It is a bit hard to interpret this 
difference as no replacement ratios are given. The interesting part of Heyma 
and Thio’s analysis is where they use U.S. estimates to predict participation in 
the Netherlands and vice versa. This shows that, if the Dutch had the American 
coefficients, labor force participation  would even be higher than it is in the 
United  States,  whereas, if  the Americans  had  the Dutch coefficients,  labor 
force participation in the United States would be even lower than it is in the 
Netherlands.  This suggests that the explanation for the observed differences 
between the United States and the Netherlands is not a matter of different char- 
acteristics of individuals but rather a matter of a different institutional environ- 
ment. The two main features of this institutional environment are financial in- 
centives and eligibility rules, both of which are not, or not fully, taken into 
account in the comparison in Heyma and Thio (  1994).17 
Heyma (1996) addresses both these elements in a dynamic programming 
model of retirement decisions. He takes into account the three exit routes men- 
tioned earlier and allows for the possibility of layoffs. Except for working, all 
states (disability, unemployment, and retirement) are assumed to be absorbing 
states. He builds financial incentives and eligibility rules into his model. Hav- 
ing estimated the model, he simulates such policy changes as later eligibility 
for early retirement, raising the mandatory retirement  age by two years, and 
lower early retirement benefits. The effects found are substantial. For example, 
if  the early retirement  benefits  are set equal to disability benefits,  the labor 
force participation of sixty-two-year-olds easily doubles. Heyma, Lindeboom, 
and Kerkhofs (1  997) extend this model by using data on individual behavior, 
17. The inclusion of log wages captures some financial incentive aspect, but, since no replace- 
ment ratios are used, it is not clear what to make of it. 302  Arie Kapteyn and Klaas de Vos 
survival rates, and private pensions and firm data. The effects are similar to 
those found in Heyma (1996). Emphasizing the institutional characteristics, 
they are able to explain many of the dynamics in retirement behavior. 
The research reviewed here provides ample evidence for the dominant role 
of financial incentives and eligibility rules in the explanation of the low labor 
force participation  rate among the elderly  in the Netherlands.  However, no 
study has yet fully quantified the part of the decrease in labor force participa- 
tion among the elderly that can be ascribed to the changes in incentives and 
eligibility rules that have occurred over the last three decades. 
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